United States: Supreme Court Docket Report, October Term, 2003 – Number 3
18 December 2003

On November 3, 2003, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in three cases of potential interest to the business community, two of which were consolidated. Amicus briefs in support of the petitioners were due on Thursday, December 18, 2003, and amicus briefs in support of the respondents are due on Thursday, January 22, 2004.

2. Administrative Procedure Act . Federal Court Authority to Compel Agency Action . Public Lands. Section 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") authorizes judicial review "to compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed." 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, No. 03-101, to determine whether this provision allows courts to review the adequacy of an agency’s day-to-day management of public lands under statutory standards and the agency’s own land use plans.

The plaintiffs, a group of environmental organizations, sued the Bureau of Land Management under Section 706(1), alleging that the Bureau had violated the Federal Land Policy and Management Act ("FLPMA"), 43 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq., and the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., by failing properly to regulate the use of off-road vehicles in "Wilderness Study Areas." Under the FLPMA, the Bureau may classify public lands as Wilderness Study Areas, which Congress later may designate for wilderness preservation; until Congress affirmatively declares or rejects a Study Area as protected wilderness, the Bureau must manage the area "so as not to impair [its] suitability * * * for preservation." 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c). The environmental groups sought an injunction compelling the Bureau to implement provisions of its land use plans relating to the use of off-road vehicles in Wilderness Study Areas and to take a "hard look" under the NEPA at whether the agency should prepare supplemental environmental impact statements for areas affected by increased use of such vehicles.

The district court granted the Bureau’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning that, as long as an agency is taking some steps toward fulfilling its mandatory, nondiscretionary duties, its actions are not subject to judicial review under Section 706(1). Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Babbitt, No. 99-CV-852, 2000 WL 33914094 (D. Utah Dec. 22, 2000). The court also held that Section 706(1) does not provide a basis for challenging the Bureau’s alleged failure to implement provisions of its land use plans, and that the Bureau does not have a clear duty under the NEPA to consider whether to supplement its prior environmental impact statements.

A divided panel of the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for consideration on the merits, holding that the environmental groups could challenge the Bureau’s management of the Wilderness Study Areas under Section 706(1). Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Norton, 301 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 2002). In the court’s view, the Bureau has a mandatory, nondiscretionary duty under the FLPMA not to impair the suitability of those regions for designation as protected wilderness . a duty that is therefore enforceable under Section 706(1). Id. at 1229, 1233. The Tenth Circuit also concluded that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider claims that the Bureau had violated its own land-use plans (id. at 1235) and that the district court had erred in holding that the environmental groups had failed to state a valid claim under the NEPA (id. at 1236-40). Judge McKay dissented in part, opining that Section 706(1) should not become a jurisdictional vehicle for programmatic attacks on day-to-day agency operations. Id. at 1242-43. In the dissent’s view, that section authorizes challenges to true administrative inaction, but does not allow judicial review of agency efforts that allegedly do not satisfy completely the agency’s statutory obligations. Id. at 1243.

This case most concretely affects businesses having interests relating to the government’s management of public lands. Because the Supreme Court may clarify the circumstances under which any agency may be judicially compelled to comply with statutory obligations in the conduct of its day-to-day operations, however, this case also may affect many other businesses subject to ongoing regulatory oversight.

United States: Supreme Court Docket Report, October Term, 2003 – Number 1

3. Mineral Rights . Pittman Act . Reservation to United States of Rights to Sand and Gravel. The Pittman Underground Water Act of 1919 (the "Pittman Act"), 43 U.S.C. §§ 351-359 (repealed 1964), authorized grants, or "patents," of up to 640 acres of federal public land in Nevada to applicants who successfully developed underground water sources, but required that such patents reserve to the United States "all the coal and other valuable minerals" on the patented land. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, No. 02-1593, to decide whether the statutory reservation of "valuable minerals" includes common materials such as sand and gravel that had no market value when the patent was issued.

In 1940, Newton and Mabel Butler secured a patent under the Pittman Act for 560 acres in Lincoln County, Nevada. At that time, there was no local market for the abundant sand and gravel on the property. In the early 1990s, after the growth of the city of Las Vegas created demand for the material, the lessee of a successor owner began to extract and sell sand and gravel from the property. Petitoner BedRoc Limited, LLC, acquired the property in 1995 and has continued the sand and gravel operation.

On March 26, 1993, the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") issued a trespass notice to then-owner Earl Williams, claiming that the sand and gravel on the property were reserved to the United States. Shortly thereafter, the BLM issued a decision finding Williams in trespass, and in 1997 the Interior Board of Land Appeals ("IBLA") affirmed. Earl Williams, 140 I.B.L.A. 295 (1997). BedRoc and Williams brought an action to quiet title in federal district court. The district court granted summary judgment to the United States, ruling that sand and gravel are "valuable materials" reserved to the United States under the Pittman Act. 50 F. Supp. 2d 1001 (D. Nev. 1999).

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. 314 F.3d 1080 (2002). Concluding that the statutory text is ambiguous, the court turned to legislative history and other sources to determine whether Congress intended to include sand and gravel within the reservation of "valuable minerals." As evidence that it did, the court cited congressional debate indicating that all minerals were reserved (id. at 1087-1088), and pointed to contemporaneous federal publications describing sand and gravel as among the country’s "mineral resources" (id. at 1088-1089). The court also relied on Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36, 103 (1983), in which the Supreme Court determined that gravel was reserved to the United States in grants made under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act, which was enacted three years before the Pittman Act. The court rejected BedRoc’s argument that the question whether sand and gravel were "valuable minerals" was factual and site-specific, deciding instead that "the question is a straightforward legal one regarding congressional intent as to the scope of the mineral reservation contained in the statute." 314 F.3d at 1090.

This case is of obvious interest to businesses holding interests in land patented under the Pittman Act. Because the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that sand and gravel are "valuable minerals" may be applied to other grants of federal land, the Supreme Court’s decision also may affect other businesses across the western United States that extract sand and gravel or rely on their abundant supply for construction projects.