by Matthew Spalding
This
piece has been excerpted from testimony before the Executive Overreach
Task Force for the House Judiciary Constitution and Civil Justice
Subcommittee.
“In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men,
the great difficulty lies in this,” Madison writes in Federalist 51,
“You must first enable the government to control the governed; and in
the next place oblige it to control itself.”
That meant that, in addition to performing its proper constitutional
functions, there needed to be an internal check to further limit the
powers of government. For that purpose, the Founders not only divided
power, but also set it against itself.
This separation of powers is the defining structural mechanism of the
Constitution. It divides the powers of government among three branches
and vests each with independent powers and responsibilities.
“The accumulation of all powers,” Madison notes in Federalist 47,
“legislative, executive and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of
one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”
Thus, for “the preservation of liberty,” each branch has only those
powers granted to it, and can do only what its particular grant of power
authorizes it to do.
“In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men,
the great difficulty lies in this,” Madison writes in Federalist 51,
“You must first enable the government to control the governed; and in
the next place oblige it to control itself.”
That meant that, in addition to performing its proper constitutional
functions, there needed to be an internal check to further limit the
powers of government. For that purpose, the Founders not only divided
power, but also set it against itself.
This separation of powers is the defining structural mechanism of the
Constitution. It divides the powers of government among three branches
and vests each with independent powers and responsibilities.
“The accumulation of all powers,” Madison notes in Federalist 47,
“legislative, executive and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of
one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”
Thus, for “the preservation of liberty,” each branch has only those
powers granted to it, and can do only what its particular grant of power
authorizes it to do.
...The U.S. has been moving down the path of administrative government
in fits and starts from the initial Progressive Era reforms through the
New Deal’s interventions in the economy. But the most significant
expansion occurred more recently, under the Great Society and its
progeny.
The expansion of regulatory activities on a society-wide scale in the
1960s and 1970s led to vast new centralizing authority in the federal
government and a vast expansion of federal regulatory authority.
When administration is nationalized, though, it does not easily or
naturally fall under the authority of one branch or another. As we’ve
seen, bureaucracy and its control created a new source of conflict
between the executive and legislative branches.
During the first part of our bureaucratic history, Congress had the
upper hand. Congress, after all, had been creating these regulatory
agencies to carry out its wishes and delegating its legislative powers
to them in the form of broad regulatory authority.
Congress was the first to adapt to the administrative state,
continuously reorganizing itself since 1970 by committees and
subcommittees to oversee and interact with the day-to-day operations of
the bureaucratic apparatus as it expanded.
Rather than control or diminish the bureaucracy through lawmaking or
budget control, Congress has settled mostly on “oversight” of the
bureaucracy.
Today, when Congress writes legislation, it uses very broad language
that turns extensive power over to agencies, which are also given the
authority of executing and usually adjudicating violations of their
regulations in particular cases. The result is that most of the actual
decisions of lawmaking and public policy — decisions previously the
constitutional responsibility of elected legislators — are delegated to
bureaucrats whose “rules” have the full force and effect of laws.
In 2014, about 220 pieces of legislation became law, amounting to a
little more than 3,000 pages of law, while federal bureaucrats issued
79,066 pages of new and updated regulations. The modern Congress is
almost exclusively a supervisory body exercising post-legislative
oversight of administrative policymakers...
And therein lays most of the problems we face
Issues of concern to people who live in the west: property rights, water rights, endangered species, livestock grazing, energy production, wilderness and western agriculture. Plus a few items on western history, western literature and the sport of rodeo... Frank DuBois served as the NM Secretary of Agriculture from 1988 to 2003. DuBois is a former legislative assistant to a U.S. Senator, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Interior, and is the founder of the DuBois Rodeo Scholarship.
Monday, April 04, 2016
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1 comment:
The separation of powers is broken.
The Executive branch acts as a dictator and not an executive administrating to the laws passed by the Legislative branch.
The Judicial branch walks all over the Legislative branch by constantly legislating from the bench; ruling by case law precedents, mutating away progressively each time from any original statutes intent and rights. Even when the statute is put before them on a silver platter it's ignored. Lawyers and judges making grand speeches that espouse the US Constitution, Bill of Rights, the three branches of government, say they respect the laws passed by the legislatures, and then do the opposite.
The Legislative branch acquiesces their duty, passive and powerless to the other two branches that walk all over them.
Total absolute corruption.
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